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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JUNE TRAPP, ) 
) APPELLEE'S RESPONSIVE 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) BRIEF 
vs. ) Case No. 900485 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, ) Priority No. 14(b) 
Defendant/Appellee. ) 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2-2(3)(j). Appellant appealed to this Court from an 
Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Appellee dated 
September 25, 1990. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Does Salt Lake City have a "special relationship" with 
each member of the public, including Plaintiff Trapp, creating a 
special duty of care to everyone who travels upon City sidewalks? 
2. Are decisions by Salt Lake City officials on how and 
where to expend scarce resources on sidewalk repair discretionary 
functions to which governmental immunity attaches? 
3. Is Salt Lake City strictly liable for all sidewalk trip 
and fall accidents, whether the City has actual notice of a 
sidewalk defect or not? 
4. Can a plaintiff who does not know what caused her to 
stumble and fall on a public sidewalk and must thus rely on 
conjecture and speculation to establish her case survive a Motion 
for Summary Judgment? 
STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Upon review of a grant of the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
this Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Briggs v. 
Hoicomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). This Court reviews 
the legal conclusions made by the District Court for legal 
correctness. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff June Trapp (hereafter "Trapp") filed the Complaint 
herein June 26, 1989, alleging, inter alia, that Defendant Salt 
Lake City Corporation (hereafter "City") was liable for injuries 
sustained when Trapp fell on a City sidewalk. (Record on Appeal, 
hereafter "R," 2). The City answered, denying liability for 
Trapp's alleged injuries (R. 14) and, after the completion of 
some discovery (Interrogatories, plaintiff's deposition) moved 
the District Court for Summary Judgment on June 19, 1990. (R. 
25). 
The City's Motion for Summary Judgment was based on several 
legal points. The City's primary argument was that it owed no 
duty of care to Plaintiff under the "Public Duty Doctrine," most 
recently addressed by this Court in the case of Ferree v. State 
of Utah, 748 P.2d 147 (Utah 1989). (R. 32-34). The City also 
contended that it had statutory immunity regarding the alleged 
causes of action and regarding the discretionary functions of 
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funding and scheduling sidewalk repair. (R. 32-34). The City 
further argued that Plaintiff was the only negligent party in the 
action, and that Plaintiff's alleged damages were based purely on 
speculation and conjecture. (R. 39-42). 
Trapp's opposition argued that sufficient disputed facts 
existed to preclude Summary Judgment. (See, generally, R. 42-
53). In support of that contention, Trapp filed an Affidavit by 
Trapp's son, based in part on hearsay statements regarding 
Trapp's accident and also on a post-accident examination of an 
area of sidewalk designated by Trapp as one in which she believed 
she could have tripped. (R. 54-58). Trapp also argued that the 
City's reliance on the public duty doctrine was misplaced, 
although she conceded that she had no special relationship to the 
City. 
The City replied to Trapp's opposition (R. 60-65) and, after 
a hearing on the City's Motion, Judge Richard H. Moffat ordered 
that Summary Judgment be entered for the City (R. 69-75). 
The Court's decision touched all the points raised by the 
City. With regard to the "duty of care" argument, the Court held 
that because no special relationship existed between Trapp and 
the City, Salt Lake City owed no duty to Trapp. (R. 69-70). The 
requirement of a "special relationship" was based on the Court's 
reading of Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 147 (Utah 1989) and 
Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). (R. 70). 
The Court further found that the City does not have 
sufficient economic resources or personnel to inspect and repair 
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every potential problem with the approximately 800 lineal miles 
of sidewalk in the corporate City limits. (R. 70). The Court 
also found that Trapp, who fell on the sidewalk on a sunny day, 
was well acquainted with the area in question, having walked in 
that area many times before the incident. (R. 70). An order of 
dismissal with prejudice was entered September 25, 1990 (R. 72). 
This appeal followed, after which Trapp filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition seeking summary reversal of the trial court's 
Order. The City countered with a Cross-Motion for Summary 
Disposition, seeking summary affirmance. 
On December 21, 1990, this Court granted Trapp's Motion for 
Summary Reversal and instructed the trial court to vacate the 
summary judgment and reinstate the case for trial on the merits. 
Ten days later, the City petitioned this Court for 
reconsideration of the Summary Disposition, which petition was 
granted on February 6, 1991. 
Trapp filed her opening brief herein April 8, 1991. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are undisputed. 
1. On or about May 11, 1988, a sunny day, between noon and 
1:00 p.m., Trapp tripped and fell while walking eastbound on the 
north side of 300 South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Trapp's 
Complaint, 13, 5; R. 2-6; Plaintiff's deposition, p. 17, 11.6-9, 
referenced in Memo in Support of Summary Judgment, R. 31. See 
also R. 69-70) . 
2. Trapp had traveled in that area many times prior to the 
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incident. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 17, 11.6-9, R. 31). 
3. Trapp did not recall what happened at the time, but 
concluded, after the fact, that there was a rise in the sidewalk 
which must have caused her to fall. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 
16, 11.12-13; p. 17, 11.12-19, R. 31), 
4. Trapp did not actually notice this rise at the time of 
the fall, but sent her son, who had been out of town at the time 
of the accident, to look at the sidewalk at a later date. 
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 17, 11.16-19; R. 31; See also R. 54-
58) . 
5. Trapp has never been able to specify the exact area of 
her trip and fall. 
6. There was no allegation or finding that the City had any 
actual notice of any sidewalk defect at or near the area of 
Plaintiff's fall until after her accident. (See R. 69-70). 
7. There are approximately 800 lineal miles of public 
sidewalk within the corporate limits of Salt Lake City. (See R. 
69-70) . 
8. The City does not have sufficient economic resources or 
personnel to inspect and/or repair every potential problem with 
every sidewalk within the City limits. (R. 70). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SPECIAL DUTY OWED BY THE 
CITY TO TRAPP, THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
In Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989), this Court 
reiterated and refined the "Public Duty Doctrine" in Utah, 
Holding that a governmental entity cannot be liable for 
negligence absent a duty of care owed by the governmental entity 
to a plaintiff as an individual, the Court set out the standard 
by which a determination of legal duty should be measured: 
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a 
plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed by 
the defendant to the plaintiff. (Citations omitted). 
Duty is "a question of whether the defendant is under 
any obligation for the benefit of a particular 
plaintiff . . . ." 
• * * 
For a governmental agency and its agents to be liable 
for negligently caused injury suffered by a member of 
the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty 
owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an 
obligation owed to the general public at large by the 
governmental official. 
Ferree v. State, supra at 151. (Emphasis added.) 
The requirement that a plaintiff show a "special duty" owed 
him as an individual exists because municipalities are not 
"insurers against the consequences of all injuries associated 
with their operations." Johnson v. Salt Lake City, 629 P.2d 432 
at 434 (Utah 1981). Instead, in order for a duty to exist on the 
part of a defendant, "a special relationship must have existed 
. . ." between the parties. Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, at 
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1189 (Utah 1989). The duty issue should be decided before the 
question of sovereign immunity is addressed, Ferree, supra, at 
152-153. Thus, the primary issue facing the District Court in 
determining whether Summary Judgment was proper was whether a 
special relationship existed between Trapp and Salt Lake City 
separate and apart from the duty owed to the public in general. 
See Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); Obrav 
v. Malmberq, 585 P.2d 160 (Utah 1971); Christensen v. Hayward, 
694 P.2d 612 (Utah 1984). 
In the instant case, the District Court's decision regarding 
duty was easy and dispositive. Trapp admitted (and has 
reiterated before this Court) that no "special relationship" 
between her and Salt Lake City existed. See Plaintiff's 
"Combined Memorandum in Opposition," filed herein December 4, 
1990, p. 2. Under the plain dictates of the law, then, Summary 
Judgment was mandated. 
Trapp has, however, appealed the District Court's decision 
on the basis of arguments that were not presented below. Trapp 
first argues that the City is under a legal "special duty" toward 
all members of the public, including plaintiff, who may traverse 
the sidewalks of the City. Thus, the argument seems to go, the 
"special relationship" requirement of Ferree is met here. In 
addition, Trapp then separately argues that a municipality's duty 
to maintain its sidewalks is somehow an exception to the "public 
duty doctrine." Both arguments are meritless. Both will be 
considered in turn. 
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A. The "Duty" Argument 
In support of the proposition that the City has a non-
delegable duty to keep sidewalks safe, Trapp cites five cases, 
Rollow v. Qqden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791 (1926), Nyman v. 
Cedar City, 361 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1961), Murray v. Qqden City, 548 
P.2d 896 (Utah 1976), Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 
1982) and Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) 
Assuming, arguendo, that this position is correct, however, 
Trapp's point begs the question: To whom is this duty owed? 
Trapp responds that the duty is owed "to everyone who uses the 
sidewalk. By definition it is a public duty." (Appellant's 
Brief, page 8.) 
Trapp then argues that these cases somehow create the 
"special relationship" required in Ferree with every member of 
the public. Alternatively, she suggests that the requirement of 
a special relationship is somehow obviated by these cases. 
These semantic gyrations make no sense. Ferree does not 
recognize a "mass special relationship." Such a construction 
would gut the entire concept of individual special relationship 
on which Ferree is based. Indeed, a "special relationship" with 
everyone equates to a "special relationship" with no one. 
Trapp's argument thus creates Orwellian definitional doublespeak 
that turns "special" into "general" and thus renders it devoid of 
meaning or purpose. The "special relationship" requirement of 
Ferree must mean what it says in order to have any legal or 
logical vitality. There must actually be an individual 
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relationship with an individual plaintiff before a duty to that 
plaintiff can exist. Otherwise, the exact result which Ferree 
was meant to avoid comes about: Anyone could argue that the 
public duty to all is a private duty to him as an individual. 
This translates into a form of strict liability for Utah local 
government. The whole concept of "duty" would be turned on its 
head. 
The Ferree case recognizes and approves the public policy 
behind the public duty doctrine: The public interest is not 
served by imposing liability on government or its officials which 
would expose the government to potentially every wrong that flows 
from necessary government operations. See Ferree, supra at 151. 
There are several factors that comprise this aspect of the public 
interest, the most obvious being financial. Government simply 
does not possess the resources to insure that its operations and 
programs will be carried out without some risk and occasional 
injury. In upholding the public duty doctrine in a corrections 
context, this Court said, "parole and probation programs are 
subject to occasional tragic failures . . . but they are also 
practically indispensable." Ferree, at 151. The Court 
recognized that government cannot afford to make such programs 
failsafe, nor can society afford to do without the programs. 
Such is also the case with public streets and sidewalks. 
They are a public necessity. They are also the scene of 
occasional failure and tragedy. Government cannot afford to be 
exposed to every potential problem in connection with its 
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sidewalks, nor does it have the resources to insure that problems 
with the sidewalks will never arise. 
Here, the District Court found that Salt Lake City has over 
800 miles of sidewalk within in City limits. (R. 70.) Over 
time, problems of maintenance and repair of those sidewalks will 
arise. However, Salt Lake City is, and has been, in a budget 
crisis which severely limits the financial resources which are 
available for sidewalk repair and other governmental programs and 
needs. Given these realities, it does not serve the public 
interest to impose strict liability on the City in connection 
with injuries which may be connected with sidewalks. See, 
generally, Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 
506, (Utah 1989). ("Far more persons would suffer if government 
did not perform these functions at all than would be benefitted 
by permitting recovery in those cases where the government is 
shown to have performed inadequately. " Id., at 513, quoting 4 
Calif. Law Revision Comm'n, Reports, Recommendations and Studies 
(1963).) Similarly, it does not serve the public interest for 
court to second-guess a policy maker's decisions on the 
allocation of limited funds for sidewalk repair. Traditional 
notions of separation of powers preclude judicial interference 
into executive decision-making. 
Here, the public interest is best served by imposing 
liability only where a plaintiff can show that government failed 
to fulfill a specific need created by an individual "special 
relationship" between the plaintiff and the government. 
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Thus, a simple recitation that a public entity owes a non-
delegable duty is not dispositive of any issue unless a plaintiff 
can show that the duty extends specifically to her as an 
individual. Trapp here cannot meet this requirement. The cases 
cited by Trapp do not relieve her of this requirement. Trapp's 
generalized "duty to maintain sidewalks" argument must fail. 
B. The "Sidewalk Exception" Argument 
Trapp's second point presents her alternative defense that 
although the public duty doctrine remains the law in Utah, cases 
involving sidewalks are an exception to this doctrine. Trapp 
admits that there is no explicit "sidewalk exception" to be found 
in the cases. Instead, this Court is expected to divine this 
concept by more subtle means. Trapp posits that because the 
cited "sidewalk cases" co-existed with the pre-Ferree public duty 
doctrine cases, the "sidewalk exception" is implicit under her 
reading of Utah law. 
Trapp's argument on this point is fraught with problems. 
There is no language, either general or specific, in any of the 
cases cited by Trapp which creates or recognizes this claimed 
exception to the Public Duty Doctrine. In fact, Trapp has cited 
no language from those cases in which the issue of public duty 
was ever addressed. It does not appear from the cases that the 
Public Duty Doctrine defense was ever submitted by the affected 
municipalities or considered by the Court. In any case, this 
Court did not explicitly deal with the doctrine in any of those 
cases. It appears that this is the first case in which the 
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application of the public duty doctrine to sidewalk defect cases 
has been squarely presented before this Court. It thus cannot be 
maintained that in any of those pre-Ferree cases this Court 
somehow created a definite exception to the rule most 
definitively stated in the Ferree case. Therefore, the District 
Court could not have erred in failing to recognize an "exception" 
which does not exist. 
In addition, Trapp is raising this "sidewalk exception" 
argument for the first time on appeal. The record is bereft of 
any reference to this newly-discovered "exception" to the rule 
being pointed out to the District Court. If for no other reason, 
this argument should be rejected on that ground. General 
Appliance Corp. v. Howe Inc., 516 P.2d 376 (Utah 1973); Simpson 
v. General Motors Corp., 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 1970). Again, the 
District Court can hardly be charged with committing error in not 
recognizing an "exception" which Trapp also did not recognize 
when presenting her case before the Court. 
Trapp's arguments in opposition to the District Court's 
conclusion on legal duty are groundless. Summary Judgment was 
proper and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD ON 
ALTERNATE POLICY GROUNDS. 
Viewed in its broad policy context, this matter is much more 
than a simple trip and fall case. Here, this Court must resolve 
important issues of public policy which may appear, at first 
blush, to be in conflict. 
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On the one hand, as pointed out above, this Court has 
pronounced the "public duty doctrine" in Ferree, having taken 
consideration of the costs and benefits to the public of 
necessary government functions, concluding that without a showing 
of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the 
government, no duty to the plaintiff exists. 
On the other hand, this Court has pronounced that a 
municipality owes a non-delegable duty to maintain its sidewalks. 
The philosophical and policy underpinnings for these two 
positions would appear to be at odds. If the public duty 
doctrine is strictly adhered to in sidewalk cases, it may seem 
that a form of absolute immunity would attend the government's 
construction and maintenance of its sidewalks. It is difficult 
to conceive of a situation in which any one-to-one "special 
relationship" between government and any particular member of the 
public could exist as far as sidewalk safety is concerned. The 
government would come away from every sidewalk accident a winner. 
If the "non-delegable duty" doctrine is carried to its 
logical extreme, at least as characterized here by Plaintiff 
Trapp, just the opposite result would obtain. The government 
would be absolutely liable for every sidewalk trip and fall, 
being unable to ever relieve itself from its duty to keep the 
public sidewalks safe for everyone. This would, by definition, 
read the public duty doctrine out of existence. The government 
would come away from every sidewalk case a loser. 
A middle ground between these two extremes must provide a 
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means for a plaintiff to recover without doing violence to 
government's discretionary ability to allocate its limited 
resources as its executives and policymakers think best. 
In order to resolve these apparent conflicts, it may be 
necessary to look at a policy picture larger than the limited 
determination of "duty" only, and analyze issues of 
foreseeability of harm and the reasonableness of efforts to 
alleviate the risk of harm. 
The best way the "public duty doctrine" and the "non-
delegable sidewalk duty" doctrines can be reconciled is within 
the context of analyzing the foreseeability of injury. Simply 
put, if the injuries to a particular plaintiff or class of 
plaintiffs are reasonably foreseeable by the government, the 
requisite "special relationship" would be met by an injured 
plaintiff. If, on the other hand, an action by government could 
not be reasonably foreseen to cause the particular harm to a 
particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs, no special 
relationship would exist and no recovery could follow. 
The first question in such an analysis is what would trigger 
the "reasonable foreseeability of harm?" In order to insure that 
public policy is best served, there must be a "bright line" in 
sidewalk cases: actual notice of a sidewalk defect. If the City 
is on actual notice of a dangerous sidewalk condition, a "special 
relationship" would thus develop between the City and a claimant 
injured at that location. The "duty" threshold being reached, a 
court would then go on to the next step; determining governmental 
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immunity (and deciding whether a decision to repair or not repair 
a defect upon which notice has been given is subject to the 
immunity which attends discretionary actions). 
Adoption of the "actual notice" standard is also consistent 
with this Court's pronouncements regarding "non-delegable" duties 
in sidewalk cases. Under this standard, the City's non-delegable 
duty arises only when the City knows there is a problem. It is 
only at that point that the City can do anything about it. It is 
only at that point that the City can reasonably foresee injuries 
to particular people from that particular defect. 
It is against the backdrop of actual notice that the 
reasonableness of the City's response should be measured, thus 
perpetuating a standard in sidewalk cases long accepted by this 
Court. In Gordon v. Provo City, 391 P.2d 430 (Utah 1964), this 
Court affirmed the standard set out in the cases of Erickson v. 
Walgreen Drug Co., 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951) and DeWeese v. J.C. 
Penney, 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956). In Gordon, the Court approved 
a jury instruction relieving the government of liability if no 
actual notice was given or no reasonable opportunity to remedy 
the dangerous condition existed. 
This standard is also consistent with this Court's holdings 
that a landowner is not liable for injuries he does not create 
nor can reasonably foresee would lead others to reasonable harm. 
See English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah App. 1989); Stevenson 
v. Warner, 581 P.2d 567 (Utah 1978). 
It should be emphasized that adoption of an "actual notice" 
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threshold should not pave the way down the slippery slope of 
strict liability, imposing on government an absolute duty to 
inspect for defects. Such a requirement would not only fly in 
the face of the statutory provisions of §63-30-10 Utah Code 
Annotated providing immunity for negligent inspection or failure 
to inspect, but would open the door to judicial interference into 
executive and legislative discretionary functions, violating 
separation of powers. Adoption of the standard would, however, 
provide a workable basis upon which cases may be analyzed and 
outcomes predicted, safeguarding the public's interests in 
maintaining a fiscally sound government and in being able to 
recover damages where government is responsible for sidewalk 
injuries. 
Viewed even within this alternative policy framework, 
however, summary judgment was justified in this case. There was 
no evidence presented that Salt Lake City was on notice of any 
sidewalk defect or potential problem at the alleged accident 
site. In fact, Trapp does not know the exact location of her 
fall. The City is thus without specific notice of a defect upon 
which Trapp was injured. The "notice" trigger lacking, no duty 
to Trapp arose. 
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POINT III 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT PRECLUDES 
A FINDING OF LIABILITY ON DEFENDANT'S PART 
AND THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Under Ferree, a District Court should first consider whether 
an individualized duty is owed by a governmental entity toward a 
specific plaintiff in a negligence case. If the Court concludes 
that no duty is owed, there is no need to make further inquiry as 
to whether governmental immunity applies. Ferree, supra, at 152-
153. 
In sorting out "first things first," the District Court 
properly confined its legal conclusions to the issue of duty, 
making no legal finding on governmental immunity. Judgment on 
the basis of governmental immunity is justified in this case, 
however. Because a District Court's judgment should be sustained 
even if a correct basis for the ruling was not specified, this 
Court should review the District Court's decision in light of the 
governmental immunity issue as well as the duty issue. Foss 
Lewis & Sons Constr. Co. v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America, 517 P.2d 
539 (Utah 1973); Green Ditch Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 390 
P.2d 586 (Utah 1964). Here, the District Court found that the 
City has neither the manpower nor the money to inspect and repair 
every potential sidewalk problem on the 800 miles of sidewalk 
within the City limits. (R. 69-70). A factual basis thus exists 
upon which this Court may uphold the District Court's judgment on 
the basis of immunity. 
The inspection, installation and repair of sidewalks is, in 
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an era of limited governmental resources, a discretionary 
function over which Utah law specifically retains statutory 
immunity. Utah Code Annotated 63-30-10(1)(A).l The Utah Court 
of Appeals recognized this principle in the case of Duncan v. 
Union Pacific Railroad, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), holding 
that highway maintenance and improvement are fiscal matters which 
require the discretionary allocation of limited funds. The 
action of making priorities for the application of those funds is 
not properly reviewable by the Court, and is properly immune from 
legal challenge: 
Highway maintenance and improvements are predominately 
fiscal matters. Every highway could probably be made 
safer by further expenditures but we will not hold UDOT 
(and implicitly the legislature) negligent for having 
to strike a difficult balance between the need for 
greater safety and the burden of funding improvements 
. . . it is not fiscally feasible to equip [all 
crossings] with the best possible means of assuring 
traffic safety . . . 
[I]n a tort action such as this, [judicial] deference 
to a governmental function is absolute unless waived, 
and we do not review it at all under tort principles. 
Duncan, supra, at 597. See also Gillman v. Department of 
Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989). 
Section 63-30-10(1)(D), Utah Code Annotated, provides that 
governmental immunity is not waived for negligent inspections, 
inadequate inspections or failure to inspect. The express intent 
of the Utah legislature is to totally exempt municipalities from 
liability for failure to discover any one of the myriad things 
xIn fact, the legislature's broad grant of immunity extends 
essentially to all governmental functions, discretionary or not. 
See Utah Code Annotated 63-30-2(4)(a). 
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which may go wrong in the conduct of public business. As 
recognized in the Duncan case: 
Much of everyday life presents hazards; driving or 
walking along the street are hazardous, and so are 
stairs, electricity, and many other things, but we 
tolerate those hazards because of the impracticability 
of eliminating them. In determining whether a mishap 
involving one of those hazards is tortious, the 
question is not whether a hazard existed, but rather, 
whether, under prevailing community standards, the 
defendant should bear the responsibility to discover 
and meliorate a hazard, in light of the practicability 
of doing so and the costs and benefits to society 
requiring the defendant so to act. 
Duncan, supra, at 596. 
Clearly, the decision as to whether and/or how to apply 
government funds for the inspection, repair, and maintenance of 
sidewalks is a discretionary function which the legislature 
clearly intended to include within the ambit of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Otherwise, either the government 
would be held to a strict liability standard relative to any 
injuries which occur on its sidewalks or the Courts would be set 
up as a sort of super-legislature, questioning and ultimately 
passing judgment on the wisdom of all challenged discretionary 
decisions which have been reserved for the executive and 
legislative branches of government. Such a scenario would make 
public administration all but impossible and thus must be 
avoided. As stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. 
Gaubert, U.S. , 59 USLW 4244 (1991), in which 
discretionary immunity was extended for any administrative act 
"that involves choice or judgment," jEd. at 4247, the purpose of 
immunity is to "prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative 
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and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and 
political policy through the medium of an action in tort." Id. 
at 4246. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990). 
Frank v. State of Utah, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).2 
2As noted in the "Recent Developments" article of 79 Utah 
Law Review 247 (1987), the determination of governmental immunity 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act involves a three-step 
analysis: 
To determine whether immunity applies in a particular 
case, the Act establishes a three-step analysis. 
First, the court determines whether the injury 
complained of resulted from the exercise of a 
governmental function. Footnote 22; see Utah Code 
Annotated §63-30-3 (1986). . . . 
Classifying a government activity as a governmental 
function, however, does not automatically signal 
unconditional immunity under the Act. The Act 
expressly waives immunity for specific governmental 
functions. Under step two of the analysis, the court 
determines whether the state has waived its immunity 
for the particular governmental function in question. 
Footnote 28: See id. §63-30-4. For example, the state 
has waived its immunity from suit in instances 
involving negligence. The negligence exception waives 
immunity for injuries proximately caused by the 
negligent acts or omissions of state employees 
committed within the scope of their employment. 
Footnote 29: id. 63-30-10. 
In the final step the court determines whether the 
waiver of immunity itself is subject to any exception. 
Footnote 30: id. §63-30-7, -9, -10. For example, the 
waiver of immunity for injuries caused by negligent 
acts or omissions of state employees is subject to a 
number of exceptions, including the discretionary 
function exception. Under the discretionary function 
exception the state retains immunity from suit when 
injuries arise "out of the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused." 
Footnote 31: id. §63-30-10(1). 
Under this analysis, immunity under the "discretionary function 
exception" clearly applies to the City's acts, as a third-step 
"exception to the exception" found in Utah Code Annotated 63-30-
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Here, then, summary judgment is proper on the basis of 
governmental immunity as well as the duty issue upon which the 
lower court based its judgment, 
POINT IV, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS JUSTIFIED ON THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE, 
The District Court specifically made a factual finding that 
Trapp fell in an area with which she was very familiar, having 
walked there many times prior to the incident, on a sunny day at 
approximately noon. The undisputed facts before the Court 
further demonstrated that Trapp was simply not sure of the cause 
of her trip and fall. (R. 31). In fact, it was only after the 
trip and fall that Trapp decided she had tripped on a sidewalk 
defect. (R. 31, 54-58). She does not know exactly what caused 
her fall, and has never been able to specify the exact area of 
her fall. (R. 31). The facts also show that Trapp had traveled 
in the area many times prior to the accident, and that on that 
day the sun was shining and the weather was clear. (R. 31, 69-
70). With these facts as a backdrop, Summary Judgment in City's 
favor was mandated as a matter of law, regardless of the other 
8. That statute creates, under step two of the three-step 
analysis, a waiver of immunity for injuries "caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any . . . sidewalk 
. . . ." It is the City's position that this statute applies to 
the negligent repair of a condition once notice of a problem is 
received and work has been done in response. The statute does 
not create a duty to repair every potential sidewalk problem nor 
negate the third-step discretionary function exception. The 
immunity attendant to the initial discretionary decision on 
whether to expend the funds and resources to repair a specific 
sidewalk, in competition for government resources for other 
needed repairs is not impacted by this statute. 
21 
issues addressed above, and should thus be upheld by this Court. 
Foss Lewis v. Gen. Ins. Co. of America, supra; Green Ditch Water 
Co. v. Salt Lake City, supra. 
While issues of negligence are generally factual questions 
for jury resolution, where the undisputed facts indicate that an 
accident is due to the plaintiff's own negligence, or that the 
plaintiff's case is based entirely on conjecture and speculation, 
judgment for a defendant is appropriate as a matter of law. 
This Court, in Whitman v. W.T. Grant Company/ 16 Utah 2d 81, 
395 P.2d 918 (1964) held that a plaintiff confronted with a 
plainly visible hazard is charged with the duty of seeing and 
avoiding it. If the plaintiff fails to do so, it may be 
concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent. 
In Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961), this Court 
held that a plaintiff's forgetfulness of the condition of a 
sidewalk was negligence as a matter of law. 
More importantly, this Court has held that where the 
plaintiff does not know what caused her to stumble and fall, the 
plaintiff's case is based on conjecture and speculation, 
precluding the plaintiff from establishing a case which could be 
properly given to a trier of fact. Judgment against such a 
plaintiff is proper in such a case as a, matter of law. In 
McAllister v. Bybee, 19 Utah 2d 40, 425 P.2d 778 (1967), this 
Court upheld the dismissal of a plaintiff's case in which the 
allegation of negligence against the City of Kanab was founded on 
the assumption that the plaintiff had fallen on a plainly visible 
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defect. The Court stated: 
The plaintiff alighted from her car alongside the curb 
of a Kanab City, Utah, street, and was injured when she 
fell over something in the unpaved, weedy area between 
the curb and the sidewalk. With unusual candor, months 
later, she said she did not know what caused her to 
stumble and fall. 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to anybody, 
we feel that plaintiff did not establish a factually 
possible compensable case that could be given to a jury 
except by way of conjecture and speculation. Even had 
there been no speculation as to whether she tripped 
over the cement obstruction, she had known of its 
existence for many years, that it was in plain sight on 
a clear day,—and there to see if anyone but looked. 
Id. at 779. 
Here, even if Trapp was not precluded from proceeding on the 
basis of the duty defense or the immunity defense, Summary 
Judgment would have been properly rendered on the basis of the 
merits of the case. The Court's grant of Summary Judgment was, 
thus, proper and should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, Summary Judgment was merited on several 
bases. Defendant Salt Lake City owed no specific duty to 
Plaintiff and thus cannot be held liable for her injuries. 
Furthermore, Salt Lake City is precluded from liability on the 
basis of governmental immunity. Finally, the undisputed facts in 
this matter mandate Summary Judgment in Defendant's favor. 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant requests that 
this Court affirm the District Court's decision in this case and 
uphold the Summary Judgment in Defendant's favor. 
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DATED this IfjQ- day of JtM^Jt , , 1991 
'ROCER/ F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
RAHDALL K. EDWARDS 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake City 
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